Die jüdische Lobby aka Die Israel Lobby (2011)

Es heißt, die jüdische Lobby beherrsche die Wall Street, sie kontrolliere die Filmindustrie Hollywoods, die internationalen Medien, und – am wichtigsten von allem – sie ziehe die Fäden der amerikanischen Weltpolitik.

Über kaum etwas werden rund um den Globus mehr Mythen und Legenden gesponnen als über den Einfluss des Judentums. Eine allmächtige jüdische Lobby ist das Stereotyp antisemitischer Vorurteile und Verschwörungstheorien schlechthin.

Der deutsch-israelische Journalist und Filmautor Uri Schneider zeigt in seinem Film: Es gibt sie wirklich, “Die jüdische Lobby”. Ihr größtes Spielfeld ist Washington. Dort sind die Lobbygruppen eine Industrie, die einen der größten Wirtschaftsfaktoren der Region darstellt. Bei seiner Suche nach dem jüdischen Einfluss auf die US-Politik räumt Schneider jedoch mit verhängnisvollen Vorurteilen auf und korrigiert das antisemitische Bild vom bestimmenden jüdischen Einfluss auf den politischen Kurs Amerikas. Gleichzeitig vermittelt er überraschende Einblicke in die Politik der USA.

Vir: http://www.3sat.de/page/?source=/ard/sendung/159038/index.html

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Ordinary fascism aka Triumph Over Violence (1968)

In sixteen chapters Mikhail Romm, the film’s director and narrator, explores the nature and origins of national socialism. Chapter I opens with children’s drawings and reflections about the universal meaning of childhood and parenting. Suddenly, a photo of a German soldier shooting a mother appears, followed by more images of killed children, demonstrating the inhumane essence of Nazism. Romm discusses the message of Hitler’s Mein Kampf, its author, his youth and political development. Chapter IV deals with the newsreels of the 1920s and 1930s, Chapters V and IX with the ‘culture’ and ‘art’ of the Third Reich. The cult of the ‘Fűhrer’ (Chapters VII, X, XIII) is linked to the devaluation of the individual, ultimately resulting in the willing participation of millions in unspeakable crimes. The film proves the intrinsic link between the ideology of national superiority (Chapter VI) and the racist contempt for other nations materializing in ghettos and concentration camps (XIV). A discussion of neo-Nazi tendencies in West Germany and other countries, as well as the forces that withstand these trends concludes the film.

Vir: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordinary_Fascism

Taste the Waste aka Frisch auf den Müll (2010)

“Taste the Waste” enthüllt eine Realität mit Lebensmitteln, die angesichts knapp 1 Milliarde Hungernder weltweit betroffen macht. In der Schweiz landen gemäss Schätzungen der UNO über die gesamte Produktions- und Verbrauchskette jährlich 250 000 Tonnen Lebensmittel im Abfall. In Deutschland bis zu 20 Millionen Tonnen, eine Verschwendung unvorstellbarer Grössenordnung. Es ist die Kehrseite der global agierenden und hart um Marktanteile kämpfenden Lebensmittelindustrie und einer Politik, die Formen, Farben und Grössen über den Genuss- und Nährwert stellt. Und es ist ein Wohlstandsproblem. Denn in armen Ländern gib es kaum Lebensmittelverschwendung. Gerade einmal 6 Kilo pro Kopf und Jahr sind es beispielsweise in den südlichen Ländern Afrikas. Demgegenüber stehen 100 Kilo in der Schweiz und 115 Kilo in den USA.

Entlang der Produktionskette gibt es je nach Produktart unterschiedliche Stationen, an denen Verluste entstehen: in der Landwirtschaftlichen Produktion, beim Transport und Lagerung, in der Weiterverarbeitung, beim Handel und schliesslich beim Verbraucher. Viele Lebensmittel schaffen es gar nicht erst in die Verarbeitung. So werden beispielsweise 20% der europäischen Feldfrüchte sofort nach der Ernte entsorgt, weil sie nicht der gesetzlichen Norm oder dem Schönheitsideal entsprechen. Am Ende der Kette werden 56% allen Obsts und Gemüse nicht verzehrt, sondern vernichtet. Getreideprodukte haben wiederum die grössten Verluste bei der Verpackung und Verarbeitung — sowie beim Verbraucher: In den Privathaushalten landet ein Viertel allen essbaren Backwerks im Abfall statt auf dem Teller.

Bush’s War (2008)

From the horror of 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq; the truth about WMD to the rise of an insurgency; the scandal of Abu Ghraib to the strategy of the surge — for seven years, FRONTLINE has revealed the defining stories of the war on terror in meticulous detail, and the political dramas that played out at the highest levels of power and influence.

Now, on the fifth anniversary of the Iraq invasion, the full saga unfolds in the two-part FRONTLINE special Bush’s War. Veteran FRONTLINE producer Michael Kirk draws on one of the richest archives in broadcast journalism — more than 40 FRONTLINE reports on Iraq and the war on terror. Combined with fresh reporting and new interviews, Bush’s War will be the definitive documentary analysis of one of the most challenging periods in the nation’s history.

“Parts of this history have been told before,” Kirk says. “But no one has laid out the entire narrative to reveal in one epic story the scope and detail of how this war began and how it has been fought, both on the ground and deep inside the government.”

In the fall of 2001, even as America was waging a war in Afghanistan, another hidden war was being waged inside the administration. Part 1 of Bush’s War tells the story of this behind-the-scenes battle over whether Iraq would be the next target in the war on terror.

On one side, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet squared off against Vice President Dick Cheney and his longtime ally, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The battles were over policy — whether to attack Iraq; the role of Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi; how to treat detainees; whether to seek United Nations resolutions; and the value of intelligence suggesting a connection between Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 attacks — but the conflict was deeply personal.

“Friendships were dashed,” Powell’s deputy Richard Armitage tells FRONTLINE. As the war within the administration heated up, Armitage and Powell concluded that they were being shut out of key decisions by Cheney and Rumsfeld. “The battle of ideas, you generally come up with the best solution. When somebody hijacks the system, then, just like a hijacked airplane, very often no good comes of it,” Armitage adds.

Others inside the administration believe they understand the motivation behind some of the vice president’s actions. “I think the vice president felt he kind of looked death in the eye on 9/11,” former White House counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke says. “Three thousand Americans died. The building that the vice president used to work in blew up, and people died there. This was a cold slap in the face. This is a different world you’re living in now. And the enemy’s still out there, and the enemy could come after you. That does cause you to think [about] things differently.”

More than anything else, the Iraq war will be the lasting legacy of the Bush presidency. Part 2 of Bush’s War examines that war — beginning with the quick American victory in Iraq, the early mistakes that were made, and then recounting the story of how chaos, looting and violence quickly engulfed the country.

As American forces realized they were unprepared for the looting that followed the invasion, plans for a swift withdrawal of troops were put on hold. With only a few weeks’ preparation, American administrator L. Paul Bremer was sent to find a political solution to a rapidly deteriorating situation. Bremer’s first moves were to disband the Iraqi military and remove members of Saddam Hussein’s party from the government. They were decisions that the original head of reconstruction, Gen. Jay Garner (Ret.), begged Bremer to reconsider at the time. Now they are seen by others as one of the first in a series of missteps that would lead Iraq into a full-blown insurgency.

But Bremer has his defenders: “We believed, Bremer believed, and I think the leadership in Washington believed that it was very important to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that whatever else was going to happen, Saddam and his cronies were not coming back,” Walter Slocombe, the national security adviser to Bremer, tells FRONTLINE.

Garner was not the only one on the outside. As senior officials complained about inattention at the top, Gen. Tommy Franks and his deputy, Gen. Michael DeLong — the generals who had planned the war — found that decisions were being made without them as well.

“All the recommendations that we were making now in the Phase IV part weren’t being taken — weren’t being taken by Bremer or Rumsfeld,” DeLong tells FRONTLINE. “That’s when Franks said, ‘I’m done.’ They said, ‘Well, you’ll be chief of staff of the Army.’ He said, ‘No, I’m done.'”

What followed is well documented: insurgency, sectarian strife, prisoner abuse and growing casualties. But within the administration, a new battle over strategy was being fought — this one between a new secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. The clash between America’s top diplomat and its chief defense official would go on for more than two years and be settled only after the Republican loss in the 2006 congressional elections. It was then that the president forced Rumsfeld out, ended his strategy of slow withdrawal and ordered a surge of troops. FRONTLINE goes behind closed doors to tell the most recent chapter in this ongoing story, and asks what Bush will leave for a new U.S. president both in Iraq and in the larger war on terror.

Povezava: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/bushswar/view

Vir: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/bushswar/

The War Behind Closed Doors (2003)

As the U.S. stands at the brink of war with Iraq, many are now warning about the potential consequences: the danger of getting bogged down in Baghdad, the prospect of longtime allies leaving America’s side, the possibility of chaos in the Middle East, the threat of renewed terrorism.

But the Bush administration insiders who helped define the “Bush Doctrine,” and who have argued most forcefully for war, are determined to set a course that will remake America’s role in the world. Having served three Republican presidents over the course of two decades, this group of close advisers — among them Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and perhaps most importantly, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz — believe that the removal of Saddam Hussein is the necessary first act of a new era.

In “The War Behind Closed Doors,” FRONTLINE traces the inside story of how those advisers — calling themselves “neo-Reaganites,” “neo-conservatives,” or simply “hawks” — set out to achieve the most dramatic change in American foreign policy in half a century: a grand strategy, formally articulated in the National Security Strategy released last September, that is based on preemption rather than containment and calls for the bold assertion of American power and influence around the world.

Through interviews with key Republican insiders, foreign policy analysts, and longtime White House observers, the report reveals how America got to the brink of war with Iraq — and how a war and its aftermath will put these advisers’ big idea to the test.

“The War Behind Closed Doors” follows a long-running policy battle between two of Washington’s most powerful insiders and the philosophies they represent: Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Powell, who held the top military job at the Pentagon under President George H.W. Bush and other powerful posts at the highest levels of government, is a cautious realist who represents the establishment’s abiding belief in diplomacy and the containment of foreign enemies. Wolfowitz, who built a career as a smart and tough hardliner at the Departments of State and Defense, champions the idea of preemption, striking first to defend America and to project its democratic values.

At the time the Gulf War ended in 1991, Powell was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Wolfowitz was deputy secretary of defense for policy, the third-highest ranking civilian in then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s Pentagon. Powell was instrumental in stopping the war short of going to Baghdad and removing Saddam Hussein. Wolfowitz and other hardliners were less than enthusiastic about that decision.

“Paul Wolfowitz believed then that it was a mistake to end the war,” says Richard Perle, chairman of the influential Defense Policy Board and a veteran of the Reagan administration. “They underestimated the way in which Saddam was able to cling to power, and the means he would use to remain in power. That was the mistake.”

Soon after the Gulf War, Wolfowitz supervised the drafting of a set of classified policy guidelines, called a Defense Planning Guidance, for how the U.S. should deal with Saddam Hussein and the rest of the world in the post-Cold War era. Wolfowitz believed containment was an old idea — a relic of the Cold War — and that America should use its overwhelming military might preemptively, and unilaterally, if need be. His draft of these policy guidelines was leaked to the press in 1992.

“Inside the U.S. defense planning establishment, there were people who thought this thing was nuts,” Barton Gellman of The Washington Post tells FRONTLINE. “The first draft said that the United States would be prepared to preempt the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons by any other nation, even, the document said, ‘Where our interests are otherwise not engaged.’ … It spoke of punishing or retaliating for that use, but it also said ‘preempt.’ This was the first time.”

“Wolfowitz basically authored a doctrine of American hegemony,” says historian and foreign policy expert John Lewis Gaddis, “a doctrine in which the United States would seek to maintain the position that it came out of the Cold War with, at which there were no obvious or plausible challengers to the United States. That was considered quite shocking in 1992. So shocking, in fact, that the Bush administration, at that time, disavowed it.”

As the first President Bush left office, Wolfowitz’s draft plan went into the bottom drawer, but it would not be forgotten.

“The War Behind Closed Doors” goes on to recount how the Clinton administration struggled to deal with Saddam Hussein’s defiance of U.S. and U.N. containment policies, while hawks in the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party grew increasingly impatient.

With the election of George W. Bush in 2000, however, the hawks saw a new opportunity to implement a stronger, forward-leaning American stance in the world. Yet during the new president’s first year in office, skirmishing between Colin Powell’s State Department and Rumsfeld’s Pentagon — where Wolfowitz is now the second-ranking civilian — left the adminstration’s foreign policy stalled in a kind of internal gridlock.

All that would change on Sept. 11, 2001.

Four days after the attacks on New York and the Pentagon, President Bush and his Cabinet held a war council at Camp David. “From the first moments after Sept. 11, there was a group of people, both inside the administration and out, who believed that the war on terrorism should target Iraq — in fact, should target Iraq first,” says Kenneth Pollack, author of The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (2002) and a former member of the National Security Council staff in the Clinton administration.

But Colin Powell and Gen. Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, were determined to rein in the hawks. Powell’s argument — that an international coalition could only be assembled for a war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, not an invasion of Iraq — won the day, and Iraq was put on the back burner.

Yet President Bush had made it clear that the U.S. would not stop at pursuing terrorists and bringing them to justice. “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them,” the president told the nation on the evening of Sept. 11.

Four months later, with the Taliban defeated and Al Qaeda largely dispersed, Bush was ready to move on to the next phase of the war on terrorism. In his State of the Union address, he laid the groundwork for an invasion of Iraq, tying Saddam Hussein’s regime to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

“States like these,” Bush declared, “and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world. … The United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”

The stage was set. Phase two was underway, and preemption would get its test case. The president had set a course for the U.S. to use its military power not only to topple Saddam Hussein but to promote democracy in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. Wolfowitz and the hawks, by all appearances, had succeeded.

“I wrote a piece in the Post two days after the State of the Union,” recalls William Kristol, editor of the influential neoconservative magazine The Weekly Standard, “saying we’ve just been present at a very unusual moment: the creation of a new American foreign policy.”

In the thirteen months since that speech, the Bush administration has moved steadily toward war with Iraq, though Colin Powell was able to convince the president to seek U.N. backing. Whether that approval is won or not, it is clear that this administration intends to alter America’s strategic relationship to the world.

Povezava: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/view/

Vir: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/

The Dark Side (2006)

Amid revelations about faulty prewar intelligence and a scandal surrounding the indictment of the vice president’s chief of staff and presidential adviser, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, FRONTLINE goes behind the headlines to investigate the internal war that was waged between the intelligence community and Richard Bruce Cheney, the most powerful vice president in the nation’s history.

“A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies,” Cheney told Americans just after 9/11. He warned the public that the government would have to operate on the “dark side.”

In “The Dark Side,” FRONTLINE tells the story of the vice president’s role as the chief architect of the war on terror, and his battle with Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet for control of the “dark side.” Drawing on more than 40 interviews and thousands of documents, the film provides a step-by-step examination of what happened inside the councils of war.

Early in the Bush administration, Cheney placed a group of allies throughout the government who advocated a robust and pre-emptive foreign policy, especially regarding Iraq. But a potential obstacle was Tenet, a holdover from the Clinton administration who had survived the transition by bypassing Cheney and creating a personal bond with the president.

After the attacks on 9/11, Cheney seized the initiative and pushed for expanding presidential power, transforming America’s intelligence agencies and bringing the war on terror to Iraq. Cheney’s primary ally in this effort was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

“You have this wiring diagram that we all know of about national security, but now there’s a new line on it. There’s a line from the vice president directly to the secretary of defense, and it’s as though there’s a private line, private communication between those two,” former National Security Council staffer Richard Clarke tells FRONTLINE.

In the initial stages of the war on terror, Tenet’s CIA was rising to prominence as the lead agency in the Afghanistan war. But when Tenet insisted in his personal meetings with the president that there was no connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq, Cheney and Rumsfeld initiated a secret program to re-examine the evidence and marginalize the agency and Tenet. Through interviews with DoD staffers who sifted through mountains of raw intelligence, FRONTLINE details how questionable intelligence was “stovepiped” to the vice president and presented to the public.

From stories of Iraq buying yellowcake uranium from Niger to claims that 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta had met with an Iraqi agent in Prague, “The Dark Side” dissects the now-familiar assertions that led the nation to war. The program also receounts the vice president’s unprecedented visits to the CIA, where he questioned mid-level analysts on their conclusions. CIA officers who were there at the time say the message was clear: Cheney wanted evidence that Iraq was a threat.

At the center of the administration’s case for war was a classified October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that found evidence of an Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program. But Paul Pillar, one of the report’s principal authors, now admits to FRONTLINE that the NIE was written quickly in a highly politicized environment, one in which the decision to go to war had already been made. Pillar also reveals that he regrets participating in writing a subsequent public “white paper” on Iraqi WMD. “What was the purpose of it? The purpose was to strengthen the case for going to war with the American public. Is it proper for the intelligence community to publish papers for that purpose? I don’t think so, and I regret having had a role in it,” Pillar says.

For the first time, FRONTLINE tells of George Tenet’s personal struggle in the run-up to the Iraq war through the accounts of his closest advisers.

“He, I think, asked himself whether or not he wanted to continue on that road and to be part of it. And I think there was a lot of agonizing that George went through about what would be in the best interest of the country and national interest, or whether or not he would stay in that position and continue along a course that I think he had misgivings about,” says John Brennan, former deputy executive director of the CIA.

Tenet chose to stay, but after the failure to find Iraqi WMD, the tension between the agency and Cheney’s allies grew to the point that some in the administration believed the CIA had launched a covert war to undermine the president. In response, Cheney’s office waged a campaign to distance itself from the prewar intelligence the vice president had helped to cultivate. Under pressure, Tenet resigned. Cheney’s chief of staff, Scooter Libby, would later admit to leaking key sections of the NIE — authorized, he says, by Cheney. Libby also stated that the vice president told him that President Bush had declassified the material. Insiders tell FRONTLINE that the leak was part of the battle between the vice president and the CIA — a battle that many believe has destroyed the CIA.

Povezava: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/view/

Vir: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darkside/

Schooling the World (2011)

If you wanted to change an ancient culture in a generation, how would you do it?

You would change the way it educates its children.

The U.S. Government knew this in the 19th century when it forced Native American children into government boarding schools. Today, volunteers build schools in traditional societies around the world, convinced that school is the only way to a ‘better’ life for indigenous children.

But is this true?  What really happens when we replace a traditional culture’s canon of knowledge with our own?  Does life really get better for its people?

SCHOOLING THE WORLD takes a challenging, sometimes funny, ultimately deeply troubling look at the role played by modern education in the destruction of the world’s last sustainable indigenous cultures.

Beautifully shot on location in the Buddhist culture of Ladakh in the northern Indian Himalayas, the film weaves the voices of Ladakhi people through a conversation between four carefully chosen original thinkers; anthropologist and ethnobotanist Wade Davis,  a National Geographic Explorer-in-Residence; Helena Norberg-Hodge and Vandana Shiva, both recipients of the Right Livelihood Award for their work with traditional peoples in India; and Manish Jain, a former architect of education programs with UNESCO,  USAID, and the World Bank.

It  examines the hidden assumption of cultural superiority behind education aid projects, which overtly aim to help children “escape” to a “better life.”

It looks at the failure of institutional education to deliver on its promise of a way out of poverty – here in the United States as well as in the so-called “developing” world.

And it questions our very definitions of wealth and poverty – and of knowledge and ignorance – as it uncovers the role of schools in the destruction of traditional sustainable agricultural and ecological knowledge, in the breakup of extended families and communities, and in the devaluation of ancient spiritual traditions.

Finally, SCHOOLING THE WORLD calls for a “deeper dialogue” between cultures, suggesting that we have at least as much to learn as we have to teach, and that these ancient sustainable societies may harbor knowledge which is vital for our own survival in the coming millenia.

Vir:  http://schoolingtheworld.org/